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Miaoconr rbowtion tut chart (ANSI ond ISO TEST CHART No. 2) ^ APPLIED IM/1GE '653 Eost Uam St'eet Rochesttr. New York 5 4609 yu (716) *B2 - 0300 ^ Phone (716) 288- 5989 - fa» The War and Its Origin BY W. PETERSON itftiiSit tfom the Uoirertiiy Maifarine. Decvmber. 1914. THE WAR AND ITS ORIGIN QUR absorption in the incidents and our concern over the issue of the tragic drama which is now being enacted m Europe tend to lessen our interest in the causes, direct and indirect, that brought about the war. And even with the evidence now before us a complete history cannot yet be written. Disclosures have still to be made, and it may well be that fifty years hence memoirs of some of the chief per- sonages will see the light from which the world will learn mteresting and important facts that now lie hid from view. But it is none the less incumbent on each and all of us to be able to give, according to our lights, a reason for the faith that IS m us. We have not been suffering, on the British side at least, from any megalomania or war fever, nor have we acted on unreasoning impulse With us it is not a case of "my country, right or wrong." But we are fortunate, all the same, in feeling that nothing could have happened that was better calculated to bind together so instantaneously and so effectively the somewhat ill-compacted fabric of our Empire. Certain negligible incidents in South Africa have not marred the picture: they have only set it in a stronger light. Is it possible, then, that the unanimity which has mspired our action can leave room for anything to be said on the other side? Of course there always is another side. We are quite accustomed, in private life, to find two sane, sober, and sensible persons differing materially in the view they take of the same set of facts and phenomena. And when children qu;,iTel, we sometimes see them rushing at each other so impetuously that both tact and strength are needed to pull them away and cahn their surging spirits. For the time being they have lost their heads. That is what has happened to the nations of Europe-^n more senses than one ! It all At? oajne so suddenly that there was no time e'en for a quiet Only a few weeks before the outbreak of the war a briUiant celebration was held in the little university town' of Groningen, in Holland, where many British marines and other prisoners are now interned. It was a really international gathenng, of a kind that will be veri- rare indeed for many years to come. Representatives were gathered together from most of the great universities of the -orld. In their presence and m he hearing also of Queen Wilhelmina, the "Rector Magnificus" reminded us of how his university had been founded to take — the work of Louvain and Toumay, in the days when, three aundred years ago, th' Dutch provincia were wrestling with the power of Spain for an independent national existence and for liberty of conscience. How little did wo think, in tho.se piping days of p-^ace, that within a few short weeks the neighbouring country gf Belgium would be overrun by an even more ruthless conqueror; and that the head of a worid-famous German university, whose hand we clasped in cordial friendship, would now b ; handing oiit honorary iegroes to two leading representatives of the Krupp works at Essen, in recognition of their diabolical preemin- ence in the forging of death-dealing weapons of war! One never can tell, m the life of a nation any more than m private Ufe, what would have happened if a different course had been pursued. The other side holds that if Eng- land had meant war she should uave said so at once. One reason for the insensate hatred by which we are assailed to-day is that we are alleged to have waited craftily until Germany had become embroiled with both France and Russia before jumping in as a make-weight against her. Germany sincerely believed that, sooner or later, war with Russia (whom she reaUy feared) was inevitable. For a time she seems to have hoped that she might have Russia alone to deal with and she looked to England to keep Fraj.ce quiet. It was only after France too had accepted her chaUenge that we decided to go in against her, so as to turn the balance. This statement of the C8*'t» is ludicrously at varianoe with the facts, as now ascertained. We know that England was certainly not scheming how to get into the war, but nuch rather how to keep out of it. It may well be questioned whether, if we had promptly declared our solidarity with France and Russia, the war would thereby have been pre- vented. Is it not rather to ou crdif that we hesitated, and that we delayed -"°n to the verge of weakness? What better proof can be g ven tuat we were free from any actual commitment than the fact that, when France first plrdged her support to Russia, Sir Edward Grey refused to make any promise? No one says now that we ought to have continued to stand out, and so have saved our skins. For though one can never speak with certainty of what might have been, all the evidence goes to show that if we had left France and Belgium to their f<»te the German occupation of the coast- line would have been much more undisputed than it is to-day; and then England's turn would have come ne.xt. She did' well to spurn tlie Cyclopean gift of a promise that she would be "eaten last!" I have said that there was no unrea.voning impulse about our intervention. And we did not go in because we were ordered to do so by any superor authority. This is not for us —as some Americans arc too apt to believe— a war of Kings, and Emperor?, and Cabinets. Nor was it through the British Foreign Secretary that the final and fateful word was spoken: his formula throughout the negotiations was "subject to the support of Parliament." That is one of the facts which Mr. Bernard Shaw seems altogpther to have overlooked. It was the representatives of the nation, assembled in the mother of Parliaments, that voted a war credit with practical unanimity; and their action in what was put to them as a matter of duty and honour at once received the heartiest po&sible endorsa- tion, not only of their English constituents but also of men of every kind of political per&. asJon throughout all our oversea Dominions. This is government by democracy, and con- sidering the character of parliar .entary representation in England, and the sygtem of ministerial responsibility, not to the individual ruler (as in Germany) but to the elected re- presentatives of the people, one may o<wert confidently that our going to war wan as much a direct act of the British nation as it could have been under the most republican con- stitution. The same critics who profess to believe that E^ngland wanted the war taunt us at the same time with not having done more to protect Belgium. The truth is that our delay and our obvious military unpreparednoss furnish in them- selves the best of answers. Yet for both there are compensa- tions. The impressive spectacle was afforded at home of an immediate cessation from all domestic strife, with a resulting solidarity which could not have been achieved if the govern- ment had taken what some would have been certain to attack as a premature decision; while the growth of our military efficiency for fighting purposes is gtiaranteed by the fact that the Empire is acting as a unit, in a way that pro- mises more for its further organization than another twenty- five years of imperial talk. In fact, if the thiug had to be, the stage could not be better set than it is, even if we had had the whole management in our own hands. Hence these (German) tears! The inmiediate reason for British intervention was of course, as everybody knows, the invasion of Belgium. Oppo- sition to this sudden move on the part of Germany W8S for England a matter of duty as well as self-interest. She oould not well have stood aside while th<* Belgian coast-I'ne was passing into the hands of another Power — especially one which was showing so little respect for itss plighted word. That would have given the opportunity fc "pointing a pistol straight at England's heart," as the Germans are now trying to do from Antwerp and Ostend and Zeebrugge. And there was the further motive of preventing, if possible, any would-be combatant from usir? Belgian soil once more as a battle-ground. Some craven-hearted ones have asked if it would not have been better, especially in view of the immediate nequel, if Belgium iiad quiptly acquiesced in the passage of German troopn. But what a di.s«ervice to France, which had made no difficulty whatever about renewing its guarantee to respect Belrian neutrality; It would have been like letting a burglar in by a uack-door. Belgium would thereby have placed ue'wjlf in a state of w&r with France. And there is the further consideration of tl. obligations of international law. which cannot be treated as a "scrap of paper" without the direst consequences to civilization. It is an elementary principle of the law of r tions that a neutral state is bound to deny a right of pas.sage to a belligerent. Here Britain had a clear duty to perform, in the interest of international faith and the right of a weaker nation to main- tain its independence. Onf only regret is that it did not occur to the King of the beijians, in appealing to England for aid, to appeal at the same time to the United States as well! All neuii-al nations have an interest in preventing the world from being swept back into barbarism, with all its attendant phenomena of violence and terror, by an open dis- regard of so much as there is of international law. It is only a short year since the Lord High Chancellor of England, speaking before the American Bar Association on the subject of "Higher Nationality," was sanguine enough to specrlate on the growth among nations of a habit of looking to cor ,>n ideals "sufficiently strong to develop a General Will, ar to make the binding power of these ideals a reliable sanction for their obligations to each other." Lord Haldane took the German word "Sittlichkeit," or "mannerliness," to illustrate his meaning, defining it as the system of habitual or cus- tomary conduct, ethical rather than legal, which embraces all those obligations of the citizens which it is "bad form" to disregard. In view of what has happened in Belgium, he could not make such an address to-d,'\y . Germany has revived the traditional barbarism that looks to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main instrument and aim of the highest statesmanship. In place of the "Sittlichkeit" that was to incline nations in ever-increasing measure to act 6 towards each other as "gentlemen," she has substituted " Furchtbarkeit "— " frightfuhiees "— the word which was deliberately chosen by the German Emperor for the purpose of recalling the less shocking example of Attila and his horde of Huns. But the trouble did not begin in Belgivm. We must go further back for such a historical survey as may be possible within the limits of this paper. At the beginning of the chapter immediately preceding stands the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand. But there were several chapters previous to that, and due weight must be given to the argument of the other side when it contends that the murder at Sarajevo was only the culmina- tion of a long series of Servian conspiracies against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The question is one of pre- dominance in South Eastern Europe, and the change of policy inaugurated by the German Emperor, in that as in other directions, is strikingly brought home to us when we remember that Bismarck would not have been interested. Of the Bulgarian affair in 1885 he had said that it was "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." The leading motive of the assassination was doubtless resentment at the way Austria had behaved in the lawless annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. It was then that the Emperor William took his stand beside his ally "in shining armour." Russia had been effectually weakened by her experiences in the Japanese War, and it must have been a great humiliation to her, in a matter where Slavic interests were concerned, to be threatened with hostilities by Germany in the event of her attempting to take military action against Austria. To Britain the whole thing meant very little, and in the days when the streets of London were placarded with posters read- ing "To H — 11 with Servia," the ordinary passer-by did not find it in his heart to offer any objection. What we had to complain of afterwards was the extraordinary character of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and the circumstances in which it seems to have been conceived. It is significant, to begin with, that nothing was said about it at Vienna to any of the foreign diplomats, except the German Ambassador. He knew all about the message before it was sent oflf, and is said to have "endorsed every line of it." If it had not been formally communicated beforehand to the Foreign Secretary at Berlin or the Imperial Chancellor, its terms were known to the Emperor and to the representatives of the war-party that was engaged in the congenial operation of pushing him on to a point from which he could not draw back. There is a Prussian ring in the tone of the Austrian message, with its headings and sub-headings, its prescribed formulae for the Servian reply, and its demand for an answer within forty- eight hours. All other competitors for the champion-title of the "bully of Europe" may withdraw in favour of those who concocted this uncompromising document! It was really aimed at Russia and the status quo in the Balkans, and the expectation may have been that Russia would take it as quietly as she had taken the Austrian viola- tion of the Treaty of Berlin six years before. Responding to the pressure brought to bear upon her, Servia forwarded a reply in which she sought to give satisfaction, asking at the same time for a reference, as regarded one of the conditions, to the International Court at the Hague. This was rejected by Austria, and her representatives were instructed to leave the Servian capital without delay. The first efforts of Russian diplomacy thereafter were directed towards securing an extension of the time-limit allowed by Austria. This was refused. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey made more than one suggestion (25th and 26th July) for conference and mediation —Russia undertaking to stand aside, and to leave the matter in the hands of the four neutral nations, France, Gei-many, Great Britain, and Italy. But the attitude of Germany, declared with a significant element of contradiction among her various representatives, was that she agreed with her ally in regarding the quarrel as a "purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do."* « "pop/'^** the German White Book which savg (p. 4) that Germany wag perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungarj- against Servia minht brmg Russia mto the field." •» J s 8 Obviously it was here that the European train left the rails, and we know now where to place the responsibility, with all its unspeakable consequences, for refusing to accept the Servian reply even as a basis of negotiation. If each and every one of the Powers had been sincerely and genuinely interested in the maintenance of peace, they could surely have attained their ends at this stage by the simple process of getting round a table for cwiference and discussion. The horror of the denouement is intensified by the fact, subse- quently communicated by our representative at Vienna, that some change of heart had made Austria willing in the end to re-open conversations with Russia on the basis of the Servian reply. But meanwhile there had been mutterings of mobiliza- tion, and Germany's ul;:matum to France and to Russia rendered a peaceful settlement impossible. Whether it can be proved, or not— with the material at present available— that the military faction at Berlin was working for the war which it had so long gloated over in imagination, there can be no doubt that Germany must take the blame of having blocked the proposed conference. It is said by his apologists that the Emperor laboured sincerely to the end— working along a private path of his own— in the cause of peace. But it must be asked, with all deference, what right he had to any private path when the peace of Europe was known to be trembling in the balance? This is where we might have expected to hear from the various Peace and Arbitration Societies, especially on the continent of America. With all respect to the obligations of the official neutrality so carefully laid down at Washington- obligations which individual Americans like ex-President Eliot have found it hard to observe — the question naturally suggests itself why those who have worked so devotedly for peace have not as yet raised their voices, no matter how ineffectually, in protest against the mfluences which refused to invoke the concert of Europe in the only way by which war might have been avoided. By keeping silence they seem to me to have rendered much of their previous work ineffec- 9 tive and of no account in "practical politics." They are in danger of effacing themselves. It is surely not uncharitable to say that if Germany had really wanted war, she could hardly have taken a better method of achieving her purpose. Her previous record is not such as to inspire confidence. It is unnecessary to refer to her dealings with Denmark in 1864, with Austria in 1866, or with France in 1870. There is little credit in having kept the peace for forty years if it can be shown that you have gener- ally got what you wanted by merely rattling your sabre. Germany was saved from the crime of a second attack on FVance in 1875. Coming nearer our own times, it is now an established fact of history that she would have profited by CUT difficulties to intervene in the South African War if it had not been for the British navy. In 1905 she imposed her will on France, and brought about the resignation of Monsieur D Icass^, just before the Algeciras Conference. In 1908 the Emperor took his stand "in shining armour" beside his Austrian ally, whom he abetted in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And in 1911 came the incident of the Panther and Agadir, in connexion with which we were told by Monsieur Barthou in Montreal that if France had been saved from invasion she "owed it solely to the steadfast loyalty of her English allies." To-day Germany is giving proof of the thoroughgoing character of her preparations for war. Nothing need be said of her navy-building, in regard to which the Emperor indited, early in 1908, a long letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty which was obviously designed to lull him into a false sense of security. The German navy was being built purely for defensive purposes, and England was making herself ridiculous, in the Kaiser's opinion, by taking any account of it! For these defensive purposes an increased expenditure of one million sterling per annum was authorized in 1912 for a period of six years. How fortunate it is for us that when war broke out the British navy was found ready to concentrate in the North Sea, which we shall no longer call by its alternative name the "German Ocean!" 10 Nor ia it necessary to dwell on Germany's activities along other linos, such as the construction of strategical railways converging on the Dutch and Belgian frontiers, the provision of increased facilities for transports at ports of embarkation, the building in foreign territory of concrete emplacements for heavy siege-guns, the amazing volume of war-literature that issues every year from her publishing houses, cuhninating m Bemhardi's book "Germany and the Next War," the institution of a far-reaching system of espion- age by which she sought to prj' into the naval and military secrets of other nations, and read them like an open book. She turned a deaf par, as the Liberal party, under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, learned to its cost, to all suggestions for a reduction of armaments. She showed he.self no friend to any of the proposals, especially in regard to mine-laying and bomb-throwing, by which it was sought at the Hague conferences to mitigate in advance the actual horrors of war. And Mr. Asquith has told us quite recently that when, in 1912, his Cabinet thought it wise to approach her with an assurance that we would neither make nor join in any un- provoked attack upon her, declaring that "aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object," she had the audacity to turn round and ask the British Government to abandon the Triple Entente alto- gether and give her a pledge of absolute neutrality should she become engaged in any war. She asked us, in fact— as Mr. Asquith put it— to give her "a free hand" when she should choose her own time "to overbear and dominate the European worid!" And when Mr. Asquith made this disclosure (2nd October, 1914), the North-German Gazette, with true German logic, drew the inference that "the English Government was ab^ady in 1912 determined under all circumstances to take part in a European war on the side of Germany's enemies!" This record is hardly calculated, as has been said above, to inspire confidence. It does not predispose us to accept ) I I 11 without demur the statement made by Professors Haeckel and Eucken, when they complained, " Our foes have disturbed us in our peaceful work, forcing the war upon us very much against our desire." Poor injured innocents! We are more inclined to view the outbreak of the war in the light of other utterances, such as that of von der Goltz, who said that the German statesman would show himself a traitor to his country who, believing war to be inevitable and being himself ready for it, failed to get beforehand with the enemy by striking the first blow; or the notorious Bemhardi, who made a mere or less secret tour through the United States a year or two ago, addressing exclusively German societies, and telling them exactly what was going to happen and how it was going to be done. Bemhardi 's book includes, among ma*^ ' other gems, the following: "All which other nations attamed in centuries of natural development— political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade— was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to obtain must he fought for, against a superior force of hostile interests and powers." And again: "Let it be the task of our dip- lomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be a reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England that both these States would feel compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe." At Zabem, for instance, and in Morocco! Surely Professor Gilbert Murray hit the mark when he described such pro- grammes as " the schemes of an accomplished burglar ex- pounded with the candour of a child." Nietzsche correctly expressed the prevailing German point of view, when, instead of saying that a good cause sanctifies every war, he laid down the maxim that a good war justifies and sanctifies every cause! " War and courage," he went on to say, " have done greater things than love 12 of your neighbour." Germany lias been brought up to believe in war, not as a disagreeable necessity, but as a high political instrument and a supreme test of national character. Imperial security for her implies the power of taking the aggressive, without consideration for the rights of others or her own good faith, wherever her interests or her national pride may seem to suggest. The latest utterance of Maxmilian Harden has let the cat out of the bag even in regard to this war. "We willed it," he says; "we had to will it. Our might will create a new law for Europe. It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new domains for her genius, then the priesthoods of all the gods will praise the good war Now that Germany's hour has struck she must take her place as the leading power. Any peace which did not win her the first position would be no reward for her eflforts." Here we have the most recent expression, naked and unashamed, of the " swelled-headedness " and megalomania which have brought our German friends to believe that they have a Heaven-sent mission to dominate the whole world. The leadership of Europe is what they have been after all the time, to begin with. And here the overthrow oi France and England was a necessary prelimin- ary. As to France, Bemhardi had shown how, after a resistless rush through Belgium, Germany was to "square her account with France and crush her so completely that she could never again come across our path." And in the same spirit von Treitschke, who believed a collision with England to be inevitable, had warned his countrymen that the "settlement with England would probably be the longest and the most diJBBcult." It is as a cons«quence of following the will-o'-the-wisp of a German world-wide empire that Germany has been brought to the pass in which she stands to-day. And when official verification can be secured of the various statements which go to prove that the war-party in Berlin was confidently counting on war long before it actually broke out, and had carefully calculated how and when it could best profit from the difficulties by which other nations, notably ^ / 13 England,* were known to be embarrassed, little or nothing will be required to make the story complete. When told, it may even help to reconcile the German people themselves to the defeat and discomfiture which they so richly deserve. But even with our present knowledge of the facts, is it not amazing to us that Germany should s^ek to fasten the blame on the other side, when she herself had drawn up such an advance programme as that which has just been described? Take England, for instance. Everybody knows, or ought to know, that there is no country in the world that has a greater interest than England in the continued maintenance of peace. She wants nothing from anybody — except to be let alone. She certainly would not have been likely, on any flimsy pretext, to provoke a conflict with her best customer. But the Germans insist that she had two motives for going to war against them; first, alarm at the rapid growth of their navy; and second, envy and jealousy on account of the marvellous expansion of German trade and commerce. No doubt the rivalry in naval armaments, where the pace has been set by Germany, has for the last ten or twelve years been a tremendous strain on i^ngland, especially under a government that would far rather have spent the money on something else; but she was doing fairly well in the competition, and with the Dominions ranging themselves at her side she would soon have had nothing more to fear. As to commercial • " The time had been carefully chosen. Eni;land was supposed to be on the ▼erge of a civil war in Ireland and a new mutiny in India. France bad just been through a loilit.iry scandal in which it appeared that the army wa.s iihort of boots and ammunition. Russia, besides a great strike and internal troubles, was re-arming her troops with a new weapon, and the process was only half thruuj4h. Even the day was chosen. It was in a week when nearly all the ambat<»<ad(>r8 were away from their posts, taking their summer botiday — the EInglish ambassador at Berlin, the Russian ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna, the Austrian Foreign Minister, the French Prime Minister, the Servian Prime Minister, the Kaiser bim.<:elf, and others who might have used a restraining influence on the war party. Suddenly, without a word to any outside power, Austria issued an ultimatum to Servia, to be answered in forty-eight hours. Seventeen of these hours had elapsed before the other powers were informed, and war was declared on Servia liefore all the ambassadors could get back to their posts. The leading statesmen of Europe sat up all night trying for conciliation, for arbitration, even for bare delav. At the last moment, when the Austrian Foreiiai Minister had returned, and had consented to a basis for conversa- tions with Russia, there seemed to be a good chance that peace might be preserved: but at that moment Germany launched her ultimatum at Russia and France, ana Austria was already invading Servia. In twenty-four hours six European powera were at war." — Professor Gilbert Murray, in " How can War ever be right ? " M 14 rivaliy, can anyone imagine Sir Edward Grey sitting down at the supreme moment to calculate the volume of trade in the Balkans, or who would get the business along the line of the Bagdad railway? No: his loyal and devoted efforts were directed exclusively to averting the horrors of war from Europe. The fact that Mr. Bernard Shaw has recently been saying something different should be received every- where as a new proof of the truth of the proposition. Eng- land's obvious military unpreparedness ought to be the best answer to any suggestion that she was planning for war. The argmnent against her is being conducted to a large extent by persons who profess to have a well-founded belief in her treachery, her selfishness, her hypocrisy, and above all her decadence and degeneracy. Here my friends the pro- fessors have filled an absolutely surprising r6le. One has to remember, however, that degeneracy may overtake institu- tions as well as nations. You would pot go to the German universities to-day for a free and unfettered expression of opinion about matters in which the German government was directly interested. The influence of the military auto- cracy, which has permeated all strata of society, has extended itself to the institutions of higher learning— yes, and to the churches as well. Many of the leading professors are Privy Councillors, and cannot always exercise the privilege of independent thought. They have followed too literally Treitichke's direction to "be governmental," and have done much to justify Mommsen's fears as to what would happen to the German people if militarism were allowed to take captive every other element. How can we otherwise explain Eucken and Haeckel? Here are some of their findings: "Undoubtedly the German invasion in Belgium served England as a welcome pretext to openly declare her hostility;" and again, "England's complaints oi the violation of international law are the most atrocious hyprocisy and the vilest Pharisaism." To these two I add Ostwald, who appears to have had a beatific vision of Germany enthroned in central Europe, 15 with the other nations grouped around her, and as a counter- poise on the Amorican continent the United States, with Cunada to the north and the Latin republics to the south leaning up against her, as it were, in deferential pose. He also seems to approve of a sort of "merger" or "combine" for all small nations, while wishing to apply the reverse process in the case of Russia. Here are some of Ostwald's utterances: "The further end of destroying the source from which for two or ihree centuries all European strifes have been nourished and intensified, namely, the English policy of world dominion I assimie that the English domin- ion will suffer a downfall similar to that which I have predicted for Russia, and that under these circumstances Canada would join the United States, the expanded republ'c assuming a certain leadership with reference to the South American republics. "The principle of the absolute sovereignty of the indi- vidual nations, which in the present European tumult has proved itself so inadequate and baneful, must be given up and replaced by a system conforming to the world's actual conditions, and esjjecially to those poMtical and economic relations which determine industrial and cultural progress and the common welfare." We had Ostwald's son lecturing for us at McGill last winter, when we little dreamed that such were the sentiments of his distinguished father. What a collapse of all our hopes of international academic solidarity! And the odd thing is that the Germans should profess to believe that it is we who have been scheming for their downfall ! It is a relatively un- important incident, but as I have mentioned McGill I may place on record in these pages the fact that when that university had the honour of welcoming a few >'^ars ago the highest lady in the land, these words were used: "Nowhere is there a fuller realization than in our national universities of the debt we owe to the country which ha 3 sent us a daughter so distinguished: and our prayer is that in the coming time Britain may march forward along the path of I« the Empire wSn^n ^"^ university centre throughout Britain's daylsSonethaUh?'" r''l\'" ''^^ ^^^^^ ^'^^t methods is nL Siiit f,l ' T^''* '^\^'^ ™ ^^^ ^^"btful Empire of wWch wf c^^^. .IJ'^'^S^ ^^P' '^^' '^^ to the vital power of Great^^ ^^. ?°"' "°' correspond had better ZpJ^oZ^T^ t'lltr!!'" '"^ ''''' '"^^ ready and able to takp ^t, k k • stronger successor, all histoo^ have we h^ aTL T'""! ^^^^^ P«^^«P« '« old saw, O^J Z>Z ^/J^i^' ''^ ^°:; *^^ application of the fromThe t:^ I re fe'tUt^"' \'''^'''' ^'^-'^ ^-- we regard it as a Sa' wa? iH t^ 'f T ^^^ *^*^ British Blue-books Wbrnrefe.^r.T'^/'"*^ ""^^^ '^' "war in defence of the Om^re" !^*km- ^°' ^"^'^ ^ » verted into a fact Th JT« ' - ^^'^'^'^y «"ddenly con- though per^X I W thTtT'.'^'^^'^'^^^^^^P^^- appear from our mid«fTh i. ^^^ °' P^'^^^ ^'^^ ^s- cairulating\rt"c?nldt°wrd tTnIhe" f^^ ^"^^^''^^ ^"^ contingency of "England embarLg o", ta/^^^^^^^^^ Canadian Parliament could not aoorovp '^ H m ^ *^® t out of his hpoH fKof Ji! approve. He could not get whethe/he would ''hi Ih' ''T''''' ^' ^"^ *° «°^«'der was he would orloufd not fil% ^'T)T'" '"^*^^^ ^^ ^^^^^er foe was at orgites What h' u . ^°' ^" '^' *™« *^« the situation home to evT.^ ^"^^* ^'^^ *'""" inwardness of Mr. Boura^ayTnd to Ih^nT '" ^"""^ ^'"^^P*' ^^ ^^^^^^^ was the spectacle of th. r *''''^"'"* Dominions as well spectacle of the German Ambassador in London 17 trying to bargain with the British Govemnent that, if England would only remain neutral. Germany would promise not to take any more of the soil of France but only the French coUmiet. If the French colonies now. why not the English next? It may be hoped that, with further progress in the direction of imperial organization— still along the line of voluntary cooperation- we shall >♦ rid now of the phrase which has so long disfigured the official publications of the Imperial Conference, "Shou:d any of the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire at a time of real danger." That is surely a worn-out formula, imposed on a scrupulous home-government by the apathy and half-heartedness of colonial statesmen. Even a warlike paper such as this must not be allowed to close without a word of praise for so doughty an ant"«?oni8t. That the British are good sportsmen is proved by ueir admiration for the exploits of the German commander of the Emden. We cannot praise other things the Germans have done in the course of this war— their spying and lying, their mine-Kying, their indiscriminate bomb-throwing, their de- struction of public buildings and artistic treasures, their terrorizing of the civil population, their military execution of hostages and their brigahd-like levy of huge ransoms from the cities through which they have passed. In olden times the robber-chief would build his castle at the head of some narrow defile, so as to take toll of all who went that way; but his modem representative moves his minions from one place to another, and presents his bill of expenses as he goes! These are certainly unwelcome results of the German love of thoroughness. There is much disillusionment in store for the Germans in the near future. At present they can see nothing but red. And they seem to believe everything they are told— which perhaps, after aU, is not very much. It is an astounding fact that while tht British Foreign Office has included in its Blue-book, and has spread broadcast over the whole world, an official translation of the German White Book, giving the German account of the origin of the war. its German transla- 18 tion of the British White Paper (in which the documents are left to 8peak for themselves) haa to be smuggled into Germany. Such a state of things cannot long continue. Meanwhile we can even afford to admire the spectacle of a great nation rally- ing round its ruler under the inspiration of an overwhelming national sentiment. The crfewd that attacked the British Embassy at Berlin only knew what it had been told: ita demeanour contrasted unfavourably w<*h that of those who gathered outside Buckingham Palace , the time of the declaration of war— not jubilant and shouting, but calm quiet, and determined. And the so-called "mercenaries"' whom Britain sent forward into the fi.mg-line were and are much \v ter posted in the facta of the case than the German conscn, hurried off with his identification disc almost before he iiaa had t.me to learn who it is that he is going o fight and where. But Germany has indeed shown a united front, which it will maintain till questions begin to be asked and answered. Then will come a rude awakening. The national conscience cannot be left forever in the keeping of the bureaucracy at Beriin. The German system of adminis- tration is one of the most efficient, if not the most efficient, in the worid. In fact I am sometimes inclined to thiak that SIX months o^ German rule would be a very good thing for many of us-say in th Province of Quebec! But it carries with It a cerr .in suppression of inu^iduality which would not find favour with u.s. The average citizen m Germany is ovrr apt to take his views from those whom he looks up to as the authorized and accredited representatives of the nation. He has too small a voice in the regulation of his ow: affairs Especially in connexion with such an issue as the one under d'scussion, It is the bureaucracy that does the main part of the work in the i loulding of public o'linion. That is why, in spite of all our admiration for German thoroughness and efficiency, we need not abase oursdves before the German system. We admire their patriotism, and their utter self-surrender at the call of country. We can learn much from their skiU in organization, their intensity of 10 purpose their devotion to work, their moral 6arne«tncM.s. and U.e.r achievements in the field of science and art and letterH. I ut on our side we have also .something to .show -omo claimn to consideration that ought to .save m from organized m..src>presentation and hate. The Empire which has nome mto collision with Germany is also the fn.i of high moral as well as .rreat practical qualities, which have extorted the admiration, if sometimes also the envy, of the world. We do not recognize ourselves when we are told that we are merel- a robber state," which for centuries ha.s prospered as the bully of Europe "-wo who have fought and bled for freedom since the days of the Great Charter down to Napoleon f Our watchword is liberty rather than dominion, and .self- governing institutions are to us the breath of life \\'c have no .sympathy with the methods or ideals of al.soluti.sm and autocratic government. Within the boundaries of our Empire peoples of widely different origin, and at various stages of civilization, are free to develop them.selve.s spon- taneously, and without domineering interference, to the highest of which they may be capable. W,. do not undor- stind any of the new-fangled jargon abo.it the State being superior to ordinary considerations of morality, and about Its material mterests being the one rule that transcends even the obligations of conscience. To u.s good i^ g(K,d. and evil IS evil, alike for the community and for tlu- indivic tLs of whom the community consists. We take no part in the worship of mere might, or force, or power, and we do not share m the cult which makes war an immutable law of humam^y. '"The living God will .see to it." said Treit.sohke 1, ^ ."^^''u ^^'''^^'^ '^'"'" ^' * *''"''*^'<^ medicine for man- kind^ This dictum may summarize one aspect of the phil- osophy of histoxy, but when it is applied in the concrete as a justification or e.xplanation of the atrocities we are witnes.sine to-day our .souls revolt against it. We want to help to de^ Ihrone that evil spirit of militarism which, rooted as it is in the bad traditions of a ruthless past, has spread its baleful influence all over Germany. The world will breathe more 20 freely if we can establish an international alliance against military despotism, so that never again shall it be in the power of a small group of individuals to work such havoc with the bodies and souls of men. The supreme compensation we 8ha claim when the day of reckoning comes is that there shal be a pause in the mad race of armaments. England has tnt^ for this before, but now she will speak, let us hope with the voice of united Europe. As Mr. Frederic Harrison has put It, m his recent pamphlet on "The Meaning of the War : If the armies of Germany and Austria, of Russia and of France, are by international convention.s and European aw reduced to moderate proportions, the blood tax will be taken off the nations of the world. The peaceful union of a European confederation may begin to be a reality, and at last the progress of civilization may advance m security, free from the nightmare of perpetual expectation of war " Meanwhile, till that time— the real "Dav"— arrives, we can all with the utmost confidence, each and every one among us, repeat as our own the words of the PrimeMinister of England, when he said: "I do not believe that any nation ever entered into a great controversv-and this is one of the greatest history will ever know-with a clearer con- science and stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interc t, but that it is fighting in defence of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world. '